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Abstract
IEEE 802.11 is a widely used technology which powers many of the digital wireless communication revolu-
tions currently taking place. It uses OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) in its physical
layer which is an eﬃcient way to deal with multipath, good for relatively slow time-varying channels, and
robust against narrowband interference. In this paper, we formally specify and verify an implementation of
the IEEE 802.11 standard physical layer based OFDM modem using the HOL (Higher Order Logic) theorem
prover. The versatile expressive power of HOL helped us model the original design at all abstraction levels
starting from a ﬂoating-point model to the ﬁxed-point design and then synthesized and implemented in
FPGA technology. We have been able to ﬁnd a bug in one of the blocks of the design that is responsible
for modulation which implementation diverts from the constellation provided in the IEEE standard spec-
iﬁcation. The paper also derives new expressions for the rounding error accumulated during ideal real to
ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point transitions at the algorithmic level and performs a formal error analysis for
the OFDM modem in HOL.
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1 Introduction
IEEE 802.11 [19] refers to a family of IEEE standards about local area and
metropolitan area wireless networks. The services and protocols speciﬁed in IEEE
802.11 map to the lower two layers, namely Data Link layer (DLL) and Physical
layer (PHY) of the seven-layer OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) networking ref-
erence model. DLL consists of two sub-layers named Logical Link Control (LLC)
and Media Access Control (MAC). The PHY of IEEE 802.11 is based on orthogo-
nal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) [28], a modulation technique that uses
multiple carriers to mitigate the eﬀects of multipath.
Usually, the analysis and functional veriﬁcation of communications and other
electronics designs, such as OFDM modems, are done using simulation. But, simu-
lation is inadequate to check all possible inputs of a design even of moderate size and
thus leaves the design partially veriﬁed. Formal veriﬁcation is a technique which
has proved itself as a complement to simulation to achieve a rigorous veriﬁcation.
Among established formal veriﬁcation techniques theorem proving is particularly
powerful for verifying complex systems at higher levels of abstraction.
In this paper, we use the general hierarchical methodology proposed by Akbar-
pour [2] for the formal modeling and veriﬁcation of DSP (Digital Signal Processing)
designs, to verify an implementation of the IEEE 802.11a physical layer OFDM
modem [25] using the HOL theorem prover [9]. The veriﬁcation is performed at
all levels of abstraction starting from real, ﬂoating-point, and ﬁxed-point number
systems down to Register Transfer Level (RTL) hardware implementation. For the
purpose of veriﬁcation, both the design speciﬁcation and implementation are mod-
eled in formal logic and then mathematical theorems are proved for correctness.
We were able to ﬁnd a bug in the modulation block where the constellation used
in the implementation did not follow the IEEE standard speciﬁcation. Besides, we
derive new expressions for the round-oﬀ error accumulation while converting from
one number domain to the other and carry out a formal error analysis of the OFDM
modem in HOL.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some related
work. Section 3 describes details of the OFDM modem implementation to be veri-
ﬁed and the methodology used for veriﬁcation. Section 4 describes the veriﬁcation
of RTL blocks of the OFDM system. Section 5 describes the error analysis of the
OFDM modem and its formalization using HOL. The last section concludes the
paper and provides hints for future work directions.
2 Related Work
There are numerous research work done on the design and implementation of the
IEEE 802.11a physical layer. Although no signiﬁcant work is done about using
theorem proving for the veriﬁcation of the OFDM or part of the system, we still
mention some important implementations of OFDM systems. In [8], a coded OFDM
system was developed using the TMS320C6201 processor for telemetry applications
in the racing and automotive environment. In [30] the authors developed a wire-
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less LAN (Local Area Network) system using the TI C6x platform. A real time
software implementation of OFDM modem optimized for software deﬁned radio is
implemented in [6]. Software modules representing discrete system blocks are cre-
ated and sequentially called upon as needed in this implementation. This software
reconﬁgurable system is developed on a TMS320C6201 evaluation module, which
is based on a ﬁxed-point processor. The work also explored diﬀerent combinations
of arithmetic precision and speed for the ﬁxed-point operations. In this paper, we
consider the design of [25]. Unlike [8], the design under veriﬁcation is not optimized
for telemetry applications and it does not use the coded OFDM technology. The
OFDM design in [30] is targeted for a speciﬁc platform and used the high level
procedural language subroutine provided by the platform extensively; whereas [25]
used Xilinx library to implement some high performance computational blocks. The
work described in [6] also designed OFDM system but it is optimized specially for
software deﬁned radio. Both [8] and [6] used the same processor platform, but [25]
has a more generic design that can be accommodated in various applications.
There exists a couple of work related to the application of formal methods for
the IEEE 802.11. Both use probabilistic model checking but none of them analyzes
the design or implementation of the system from the hardware viewpoint. The ﬁrst
one [23] models the two-way handshake mechanism of the IEEE 802.11 standard
with a ﬁxed network topology using probabilistic timed automata, a formal de-
scription mechanism, in which both nondeterministic and probabilistic choices can
be represented. Then from the probabilistic timed automaton model a ﬁnite-state
Markov decision process is obtained which in turn is veriﬁed using PRISM [22], a
probabilistic model checking tool. In the second work [29], which identiﬁes ways to
increase the scope of application of probabilistic model checking to the 802.11 MAC
(Media Access Control), presents a generalized probabilistic timed automata model
optimized through an abstraction technique. Here also the results were veriﬁed us-
ing PRISM. In contrast to these related work, we focus on a completely diﬀerent
direction. While the ﬁrst work performs model checking on a IEEE 802.11 network
setting and concentrates on the protocol issues, it is concerned more about the up-
per layers of the OSI (Open System Interconnect) model than the physical layer.
The second work also uses model checking to verify the MAC protocol which resides
just above the physical layer. In this paper, we concentrate only on the physical
layer and its hardware implementation. Moreover, instead of model checking we use
theorem proving techniques based on HOL. The above two work are totally related
with the protocol veriﬁcation and address the veriﬁcation issues related with the
upper layers of OSI model and hence more related with software veriﬁcation. Be-
sides, in the work we present here, we propose a formal error analysis of the physical
layer implementation, which is to the best of our knowledge the ﬁrst work of its
kind to tackle this issue.
Previous work on the error analysis in formal veriﬁcation was done by Har-
rison [11] who veriﬁed ﬂoating-point algorithms such as the exponential function
against their abstract mathematical counterparts using the HOL Light theorem
prover. As the main theorem, he proved that the ﬂoating-point exponential func-
tion has a correct overﬂow behavior, and in the absence of overﬂow the error in
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the result is bounded to a certain amount. He also reported on an error in the
hand proof mostly related to forgetting some special cases in the analysis. This
error analysis is very similar to the type of analysis performed for DSP algorithms.
The major diﬀerence, however, is the use of statistical methods and mean square
error analysis for DSP algorithms which is not covered in the error analysis of the
mathematical functions used by Harrison. In this method, the error quantities are
treated as independent random variables uniformly distributed over a speciﬁc in-
terval depending on the type of arithmetic and the rounding mode. Then the error
analysis is performed to derive expressions for the variance and mean square error.
In another work, Huhn et al. [17] proposed a hybrid formal veriﬁcation method
combining diﬀerent state-of-the-art techniques to guide the complete design ﬂow
of imprecisely working arithmetic circuits starting at the algorithmic down to the
register transfer level. The usefulness of the method is illustrated with the example
of the discrete cosine transform algorithms. In particular, the authors in [17] have
shown the use of computer algebra systems like Mathematica or Maple at the algo-
rithmic level to reason about real numbers and to determine certain error bounds
for the results of numerical operations.
Arithmetic errors in the implementation of digital ﬁlters and the FFT algo-
rithm have long been analysed using traditional mathematics and simulation. For
instance, Tran-Thong and Liu [31] presented a detailed analysis of roundoﬀ error
in various versions of the FFT algorithm using ﬁxed-point arithmetic. Jackson [20]
analysed the roundoﬀ noise for the cascade and parallel realizations of ﬁxed-point
digital ﬁlters. Liu and Kaneko [24, 21] presented a general approach to the error
analysis problem of digital ﬁlters and FFT algorithm using ﬂoating-point arithmetic
and calculated the error at the output due to the roundoﬀ accumulation and input
quantization. Error analysis is traditionally validated by comparing such theoretical
results with experimental simulations.
In contrast to [17], Akbarpour [2] developed a framework for the error analysis
of DSP systems using the HOL theorem prover. He showed how the error analysis
above, particularly those of Liu and Kaneko [24, 21], can be veriﬁed mechanically.
He extended this analysis to cover ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point digital ﬁlters and
FFT algorithms. Akbarpour’s analysis of DSP algorithms follows Harrison’s veri-
ﬁcation [11] of the ﬂoating-point algorithm for the exponential function using the
HOL Light theorem prover which is a prior example of formalized error analysis.
In this paper, we intend to investigate error analysis in the same way as proposed
by [2] but on a larger case study, here an IEEE 802.11 OFDM modem. Our work
proves that the approach in [2] is scalable. On top of that, in contrast to [31, 21],
which perform error analysis on single structures of FFT algorithm, we derive new
expressions for the accumulation of roundoﬀ error in IFFT-FFT combination which
is radix-4 and 64 point in computation as a computation model for the whole OFDM
structure. In ideal case, the output signal of the modem should be equal to the in-
put. But, we show that in the real implementation this is never the case because of
the ﬁnite precision eﬀects.
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3 IEEE 802.11 OFDM Modem and Veriﬁcation
Methodology
A standard block diagram implementation of the IEEE 802.11 physical layer OFDM
modem is shown in Figure 1. The ﬁrst block is the random data generator, which
is shown here merely for completion purpose. The next block is a quadrature
amplitude modulation block (QAM). For our speciﬁc implementation, 64-QAM is
used. The next block is a serial to parallel (S/P) block that can also be found in
the receiver side of the block diagram. The next block is the IFFT block, one of the
most important blocks of OFDM. The design uses a 64-point complex IFFT core
from Xilinx Coregen Library [34].
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Fig. 1. OFDM Block Diagram [25]
The IFFT uses the same IP core as FFT block that comes in the receiver.
The parallel to serial (P/S) circuitry makes the next block. The next block in the
transmitter line is the guard interval insertion circuitry. In the receiver side, the
ﬁrst block is guard interval removal block. We skip to QAM demapper (DQAM)
block since we discussed the other blocks before. From this block the data is
serialized again and the output is received sequentially.
The design ﬂow chosen for the OFDM modem implementation under study
starts from the ﬂoating-point modeling. For this OFDM modem design, the
environment used for ﬂoating-point modeling is the Signal Processing Worksystem
(SPW) from Cadence [5]. The second step in the design ﬂow is ﬁxed-point
modeling and simulation. The environment used for this purpose is the Hardware
Design System (HDS), which is a set of libraries from SPW. Then VHDL codes are
generated automatically for the whole system using HDS also. But, for some blocks
like FFT/IFFT there was no HDS counterpart and those were imported from the
Xilinx Coregen Library. Some of the VHDL codes were prepared manually [25].
After VHDL code generation, these blocks are synthesized in Synopsys Design
Compiler targeting FPGA as the hardware for implementation. Finally, the
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synthesized circuitry is mapped into FPGA using “Place and Route” techniques
and a bit ﬁle is generated.
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Fig. 2. DSP Speciﬁcation and Veriﬁcation Approach [2]
The formal speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation and error analysis used in this paper is
adopted from DSP veriﬁcation framework proposed by Akbarpour [2]. The com-
mutating diagram shown in Figure 2 demonstrates the basic idea of the framework.
The methodology proposes that the ideal real speciﬁcation of the DSP algorithms
and the corresponding ﬂoating-point (FP) and ﬁxed-point (FXP) representations as
well as the RTL (Register Transfer Level) and gate level implementations be mod-
eled in higher order logic based on the idea of shallow embedding [4] of languages
using the HOL theorem proving environment.
For the transition from real to FP and FXP levels, an error analysis is used in
which the real values of the ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point outputs are compared
with the corresponding output of the ideal real speciﬁcation. The veriﬁcation of
the RTL is performed using well-known classical hierarchical proof approaches in
HOL. The veriﬁcation can be extended, following similar manner, down to gate
level netlist either in HOL or using other commercial veriﬁcation tools as depicted
in the ﬁgure. This analysis is not covered in this paper.
4 Formal Functional Veriﬁcation
In this section we describe the veriﬁcation of the RTL blocks of OFDM using HOL
according to the methodology described in Section 3. The whole design is segmented
into diﬀerent blocks and then modeled using HOL. The resulting model is in turn
set against an ideal speciﬁcation and the HOL tool is used interactively to prove
its correctness. In the following sections we will describe in details the veriﬁcation
of QAM, DQAM, serial to parallel (S/P) and parallel to serial (P/S) blocks. For
the blocks described below, the corresponding abstract models, HOL models and
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parts of the proof strategy are provided to explain the veriﬁcation in its entirety.
For more details please refer to [1].
4.1 Veriﬁcation of QAM and DQAM Block
QAM (Quadrature Amplitude Modulation) is a modulation scheme which conveys
data by changing the amplitude of two carrier waves. These two waves, usually
sinusoids, are out of phase with each other by 90◦ and are thus called quadrature
carriers—hence the name of the scheme. It is a kind of M-ary signaling technique
where one of M possible signals, s1(t), s2(t), . . . , sM(t) may be sent during each
signaling interval of duration T. Unlike M-ary PSK (Phase Shift Keying), where
in-phase and quadrature components of the modulated signals are interrelated in
such a way that the envelope is constrained to remain constant, QAM has this
constraint removed. The general form of M-ary QAM is deﬁned by the following
transmitted signal:
si(t) =
√
2E0
T
ai cos (2πfct) +
√
2E0
T
bi sin (2πfct) 0 ≤ t ≤ T (1)
where E0 is the energy of the signal with the lowest amplitude, and ai and bi
are a pair of independent integers chosen in accordance with the location of the
pertinent message point [14]. According to the IEEE 802.11a standard, the OFDM
subcarriers shall be modulated by using BPSK (Binary Phase Shift Keying), QPSK
(Quadrature Phase Shift Keying), 16-QAM, or 64-QAM modulation depending on
the rate requested. The encoded and interleaved binary serial input data shall be
divided into bit groups and converted into complex numbers representing BPSK,
QPSK, 16-QAM or 64-QAM constellation points. The conversion shall be performed
according to Gray-coded constellation mappings, illustrated in Figure 3, with the
input bit, b0, being the earliest in the stream. The output values, d, are formed by
multiplying the resulting I + jQ, where I and Q are the x-axis and y-axis of the
constellation respectively, value by a normalization factor KMOD
d = (I + jQ) KMOD (2)
The normalization factor, KMOD, depends on the base modulation mode, as
prescribed in Table 1. The purpose of the normalization factor is to achieve the
same average power for all mappings. In practical implementations, an approximate
value of the normalization factor can be used, as long as the device conforms with
the modulation accuracy as speciﬁed in the draft standard of IEEE 802.11a in [19].
A question might arise in terms of what QAM constellation should be used for
OFDM? The answer lies in the fact that, although higher constellation gives more
bits per symbol, if the mean energy is to remain the same, the points must be
closer together and are thus more susceptible to noise and other corruption; this
results in a higher bit error rate and so higher-order QAM can deliver more data
less reliably than lower-order QAM.
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Modulation KMOD
BPSK 1
QPSK 1√
2
16-QAM 1√
10
16-QAM 1√
42
Table 1
KMOD Normalization
For the OFDM design veriﬁed, 64-QAM constellation was chosen after simulat-
ing the ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point point models in Cadence SPW. The circuitry
used for QAM mapping is implemented using combinational logic. It maps the
input integer data into a constellation point as shown in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. 64-QAM Constellation Bit Encoding
The VHDL modeling is done using a look-up table approach [25]. The QAM
block takes only 3 bits as inputs and maps to an output of 16 bits as shown in
Figure 4a. The QAM block is instantiated two times and designed to generate
the real and imaginary components as two separated outputs. Each of them is
formatted in 16-bit 2’s complement against a 3-bit input chosen from an input
of six for each block. These outputs are shown by out qam r and out qam i in
Figure 4b. The circuitry is fed by the input continuously, therefore out qam r
and out qam i are generated as continuous streams. The outputs are processed in
groups of 48 symbols which are stored in two separated dual port RAMs called
“Dual Port RAM image” and “Dual Port RAM real”, respectively. Since, this type
of RAM is generated automatically using the Xilinx Coregen Library [35] it is not
discussed further.
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Fig. 4. QAM Block and its Instantiation
The modeling of QAM is done in HOL using diﬀerent existing theories. An IF-
THEN-ELSE construct is used to embed the VHDL code as shown in the following
code:
def ∀input qam_out.
qam_imp (input qam_out) =
(WORDLEN input = 3) ∧
(if input = WORD [ F; F; F ] then
qam_out = WORD [ T; F; F; T; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F ]
else
(if input = WORD [ F; F; T ] then
qam_out = WORD [ T; F; T; T; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F ]
else
(if input = WORD [ F; T; F ] then
qam_out = WORD [ T; T; T; T; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F ]
else
(if input = WORD [ F; T; T ] then
qam_out = WORD [ T; T; F; T; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F ]
else
(if input = WORD [ T; F; F ] then
qam_out = WORD [ F; T; T; T; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F]
else
(if input = WORD [ T; F; T ] then
qam_out = WORD [ F; T; F; T; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F ]
else
(if input = WORD [ T; T; F ] then
qam_out = WORD [ F; F; F; T; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F ]
else
qam_out = WORD [ F; F; T; T; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F; F ])))))))
The above model is based on the wordTheory [33]. The data types of VHDL can
be modeled using this theory. The VHDL type BIT can be modeled using T and F
where these represent 1 and 0 respectively. BIT VECTOR can be modeled using
WORD[...] where the dots can be replaced with any sequence of T or F separated
by “;” as above. As an example, bit vector “110” can be modeled as WORD[T;T;F].
The above model is constrained using the condition WORDLEN input = 3 since the
input is always 3 bits and thus the model does not need to be generalized for n bits.
Here, WORDLEN is a function that takes any WORD as input and returns the length of
it. The model above now can be used (or in HDL terminology can be instantiated)
as many times as required to model any complex design. For our case, it is used two
times to embed the port-mapped component in HOL, and named as qam mod2. We
stick to the same nomenclature used by the designer. Below is the corresponding
HOL modeling.
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def ∀ input out_qam_r out_qam_i.
qam_mod2_imp (input out_qam_r out_qam_i) =
(WORDLEN input = 6) ∧ (WORDLEN out_qam_r = 16) ∧
(WORDLEN out_qam_i = 16) ∧ qam_imp (WSEG 3 0 input) out_qam_i ∧
qam_imp (WSEG 3 3 input) out_qam_r
This model has the same characteristics as the one before except the input is
now constrained to six bits since the input of qam mod2 will always be six.
Now that the modeling of the RTL block is completed it is time to model the
speciﬁcation of QAM in HOL. After that we will use the logical techniques of the
tool to prove that the implementation is conformed to the speciﬁcation. Since
the design is based on IEEE 802.11a we have used the standard [19] itself as a
speciﬁcation in order to verify the QAM implementation. Accordingly, for every
six bits entering the qam mod2 block, the bits are divided into three bits each,
which acts as an input to the qam block. Then, as described above, the qam mod2
block outputs two vectors containing real and imaginary parts of the modulated
input. Table 2 shows the encoding of bits for I and Q.
Input bits
(b0,b1,b2)
I − out
000 -7
001 -5
011 -3
010 -1
110 1
111 3
101 5
100 7
Input bits
(b3,b4,b5)
Q− out
000 -7
001 -5
011 -3
010 -1
110 1
111 3
101 5
100 7
Table 2
64−QAM Encoding Table [19]
One point can be noticed from the two tables is the similarity of bit encoding
both for I and Q and this helps us to model only one speciﬁcation for both, while it
is trivial to model them separately. Modeling a table in HOL can be done by using
predicates as follows:
val TABLES_QAM =
def ∀ I_OUT.
TABLES_QAM (I_OUT) =
(I_OUT (F,F,F) = ¬7) ∧ (I_OUT (T,F,F) = ¬5) ∧
(I_OUT (T,T,F) = ¬3) ∧ (I_OUT (F,T,F) = ¬1) ∧
(I_OUT (F,T,T) = 1) ∧ (I_OUT (T,T,T) = 3) ∧
(I_OUT (T,F,T) = 5) ∧ (I_OUT (F,F,T) = 7)
In the above model I OUT is a triplet which will accept three bits similar to
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the left columns of Table 2. For each and every argument of I OUT, a unique
number will be mapped as given in the tables and ‘∧’ is used as a composition
operator to construct all rows. Having covered all the pertinent details about the
implementation and a very reliable means to extract the speciﬁcation, qam spec can
be written in terms of TABLES QAM as follows:
def ∀ b0 b1 b2 I_OUT.
qam_spec (b0 b1 b2 I_OUT) =
∃OUT. TABLES_QAM OUT ∧ (I_OUT b0 b1 b2 = OUT (b0,b1,b2))
The speciﬁcation qam spec is mirrored, in the same way its implementation qam imp
is instantiated in qam mod2 imp,
def ∀ input I_OUT_R I_OUT_I.
qam_mod2_spec (input I_OUT_R I_OUT_I) =
qam_spec (BIT 0 input) (BIT 1 input) (BIT 2 input) I_OUT_I ∧
qam_spec (BIT 3 input) (BIT 4 input) (BIT 5 input) I_OUT_R
With the speciﬁcation above we have ﬁnished all the groundwork to set the
goal for veriﬁcation of the QAM RTL block. Next we will discuss the veriﬁcation in
details and the proof strategies adopted to bolster the correctness of RTL implemen-
tation. The general goal is to prove that for all inputs and outputs the correctness
theorem holds, under certain constraints, which can be stated as
∀ n inputs outputs. constraints =⇒ (implementation ≡ specification)
The equivalence can be replaced by implication which will set space for some al-
lowance in the correctness theorem by proving only speciﬁc behaviors of the system,
which will certainly weaken the sole purpose of veriﬁcation. But, there are cases
where the engineer (or anybody who is carrying out the proof work) can categor-
ically exclude some cases given the certainty that those will never occur. For our
case, it is an implication due to the constraints we have imposed in the deﬁnitions
since we are certain that there can be no other combination occurring other than
those. This justiﬁcation leaves us only to state our goal, except we need one more
deﬁnition to do so, which is as follows:
def ∀ x.
TCOMP_VAL x =
¬& (BV ()) * 2 pow 3 + & (BV (BIT 2 x)) * 2 pow 2 +
& (BV (BIT 1 x)) * 2 pow 1 + & (BV (BIT 0 x))
It is a simple deﬁnition based on boolLibrary of HOL to convert a bool word
into its real number equivalent. The function TCOMP VAL accepts a bool word and
returns a real number. The “&” symbol is an overloaded HOL operator that converts
any natural number to real number. And, BV is also a function, deﬁned in theory
numTheory, that uses another function to convert the boolean value into a natural
number.
def ∀ b. BV b = (if b then SUC 0 else 0)
The function SUC takes a natural number and returns the consecutive natural
number. So, SUC 0 will return 1. And, BIT x input chooses a particular bit
positions from input deﬁned in x. Now, we can state that our goal as - for all input
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and output and constraints, the QAM implementation implies the QAM speciﬁcation
∀ n inputs outputs. constraints =⇒ (implementation =⇒ specification)
Formalized in HOL as
∀ input qam_out.
qam_imp (input qam_out) =⇒
qam_spec (BIT 0 input) (BIT 1 input) (BIT 2 input)
(λ b0 b1 b2. TCOMP_VAL (WSEG 4 12 qam_out))
The deﬁnition WSEG m k WORD selects a portion of WORD from k to k+m-1. The
function qam spec takes three arguments and gives a corresponding output. One λ
abstraction is used to convert the selected qam out word into real number. Now,
the stage is set to apply the tactics of HOL to prove the goal. We have used the
existing theories of wordTheory and realTheory to build many helpful deﬁnitions
and lemmas to prove the above goal and thus established the correctness of the RTL
block formally. We prove the theorem and name it as qam imp spec correct. Due
to textual brevity, we do not include the whole proof procedure here line by line.
But, proving this theorem just ensures us about the QAM block and we are yet to
prove the implementation of qam mod2 imp. In order to do so we set a goal as -
∀ input out_qam_r out_qam_i.
qam_mod2_imp (input out_qam_r out_qam_i) =⇒
qam_mod2_spec input (
¯
0 b1 b2. TCOMP_VAL (WSEG 4 12 out_qam_r))
(λ b0 b1 b2. TCOMP_VAL (WSEG 4 12 out_qam_i))
We use the same libraries as before to prove this goal too. Below is the HOL
proof steps.
REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
ARW_TAC [qam_mod2_spec,qam_mod2_imp]THEN
ARW_TAC[BIT_WSEG_input]THEN
ARW_TAC [qam_imp_spec_correct]THEN
ARW_TAC[BIT_WSEG_input]THEN
ARW_TAC [qam_imp_spec_correct]
We use only built in tactics. The REPEAT GEN TAC tactic removes all the uni-
versal and existential quantiﬁcations. Next, ARW TAC is a tactic deﬁned using a
rewriting tactic RW TAC using simpset [16] arith ss. This deﬁned tactic is used to
rewrite the the goal with the speciﬁcations and proved theorems as shown in the
code segments above. We name this last proved theorem as qam imp spec correct.
Having proved the correctness of qam mod2 imp and qam imp using the theo-
rems qam imp spec correct and qam mod2 imp spec correct it can be concluded that
the QAM is formally veriﬁed. The implementation conforms the speciﬁcation given
in the standard. Following a similar approach we have proved the correctness of
DQAM block. The details can be found in [1].
4.2 Veriﬁcation of the S/P and P/S Blocks
In this section we will verify the serial to parallel block, later written as S/P, which
is an indispensable part of the whole OFDM system. Most of the basics related
to S/P are similar to those of the Parallel to Serial block, to be discussed later,
and thus will cover almost all the important aspects of both blocks in this section.
A.N.M. Abdullah et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 242 (2009) 3–3014
The concept of serial to parallel conversion is trivial. A long stream of data is
divided into several equal or approximately equal length of chunks which can all be
operated upon at the same time. From the mathematical point of view, it is the
manipulation of a vector into several columns of a matrix. However, S/P conversion
is very important in OFDM. The length of the blocks produced in S/P determine
the number of spectral coeﬃcients to be used by the IFFT, which is essential in
choosing how many frequencies are to be used. Usually, the block length is a power
of 2, which makes the IFFT and FFT algorithms most computationally eﬃcient.
Moreover, in OFDM, the data is divided among a large number of closely spaced
carriers. Since the entire bandwidth is ﬁlled from a single source of data, it is
necessary to transmit in a parallel way so that only a small amount of the data is
carried on each carrier, and by this lowering of the bitrate per carrier, the inﬂuence
of intersymbol interference is signiﬁcantly reduced.
The S/P circuitry is very simple to implement. It has its presence both in the
transmitter and receiver of the system. In the transmitter side, it is placed between
QAM and IFFT block, and in the receiver side between Guard Removal and FFT
block. The design at hand has the same functionality of of “Bits to ﬁxp” block of
SPW [5] in ﬁxed-point model. It consists of a shift register and a latch, which are
both clocked with the same rate as the input data. Six bits from input stream are
serially shifted into a register. Then they are latched for six clock cycles. There are
two control signals enable and clear to synchronize the whole process.
Modeling of the S/P block in HOL is done in a diﬀerent way than what we have
seen in Section 4.1. The modeling is not exactly one to one mapping because a
VHDL PROCESS is involved here. In fact, a PROCESS never terminates itself,
and it can only be controlled using WAIT statements and sensitivity lists. After
executing the last statement, a PROCESS will be suspended only to be resumed
later on an event in the sensitivity list. This last behavior poses a diﬃculty in
modeling it in HOL due to non-termination problem. Higher order logic is a logic
of total function and it does not allow the deﬁnition of any partial function. But,
there are exceptions which motivates us to deﬁne our speciﬁcation for S/P in a
simpler way without resorting to complex deﬁnition. For example, the following is
a total and non-recursive function that uses the expressive power of HOL [16]:
λ x. if (? n. P (FUNPOW g n x))
then
FUNPOW g (@n. P (FUNPOW g n x) ∧ (!m. m < n ==> ¬ P (FUNPOW g m x))) x
else ARB
The function FUNPOW is a tail recursive function from the theory arithmeticThe-
ory to deﬁne function iteration. The above function does a case analysis on the
iterations of function g. The ﬁnite ones return the ﬁrst value at which P holds and
the inﬁnite ones are mapped to a constant named ARB that holds all the arbitrary
values. ARB is a way to convert partial-functions into total functions in HOL. But,
using ARB will only complicate our model without any added beneﬁt. A VHDL
PROCESS is more than a simple loop and we have no cases to deal with inﬁn-
ity rather we only have ﬁnite sets of statements to be dealt with inﬁnitely. This
discussion is to justify why we did not use certain features of HOL to model our
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system which seems apparently helpful in doing so. The other aspect of the model
is that three signals clk, enable, and clear are not used since we are verifying this
module independently of other blocks, and there are no pipelining issues involved
here. Having said that we introduce the implementation of S/P in HOL as follows
def ∀ cnt out_parallel input.
Serial_Parallel_IMP (cnt out_parallel input) =
∃ shift_reg.
(WORDLEN out_parallel = 6) ∧
(shift_reg input = SHRN_bit cnt input out_parallel)
Apparently a simpliﬁcation of the corresponding VHDL code but a little analysis
will support its correct functionality. From the code, the variable cnt is a natural
number whose type is deﬁned as num; out parallel is a bool word and input is
of bool type. The implementation takes three arguments where cnt is deﬁned to
keep track of the time or bit index which is a model of the signal count. The
second variable has the same name of its VHDL counterpart and so is the last
one - input. A function shift reg is deﬁned as shift reg:bool→bool word to
mimic the VHDL signal of the same name. Variable out parallel is constrained
to six using WORDLEN function as before because the design speciﬁes so. Since
the system will receive only one input at a time and then latches all till it ﬁlls the
whole shift register, so we write another deﬁnition in HOL to manipulate every new
bit entering the system and ﬁlling the empty places with zeros
def ∀ N M w.
SHRN_bit (N M w) =
WCAT (WORD (REPLICATE (WORDLEN w − (N + 1)) F),WORD [ M ])
This deﬁnition uses WCAT which concatenates two lists is deﬁned in
word baseTheory [16] as
def ∀ l1 l2. WCAT (WORD l1,WORD l2) = WORD (l1 ++ l2)
The symbol ‘++’ is an inﬁx operator that appends two lists in the above deﬁni-
tion. The recursive deﬁnition of REPLICATE is in the theory rich listTheory which
replicates any variable repeatedly as speciﬁed. It is deﬁned as
def (∀ x. REPLICATE 0 x = []) ∧
∀ n x . REPLICATE (SUC n) x = x::REPLICATE n x
Here the REPLICATE function ﬁlls the rest of the places of the shift register with
‘F’ depending on the current value passed to it by the function and then adds
the input to it. In this way at the end of the iteration the whole register will be
populated with serial data and will be ready to be latched out.
Having completed the modeling of implementation we describe the speciﬁcation
of the block so that we can explain the veriﬁcation in the next section. We state
the speciﬁcation of the block as
def ∀ t out input.
Serial_Parallel_SPEC (t out input) = (BIT t out = input)
It simply puts the relation between the input and output of the block in terms
of bit position. At every time t, we have one input entering the block which goes
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in the bit position related to the current index of t of the output. A more general
approach would be to use the modulo arithmetic to model the speciﬁcation, but it
is not required here due to the proof strategy we will follow next.
Unlike the veriﬁcation strategy of QAM explained in Section 4.1, we adopt a
case analysis approach to prove the goal. We can deﬁne the goal as following:
∀ out input t.
(0 ≤ t ∧ t ≤ 5 ) =⇒
Serial_Parallel_IMP (t out input) =⇒
Serial_Parallel_SPEC (t out input)
It has a very generic pattern like any other goal except the constraint which
bounds t as, 0 ≤ t ≤ 5. Bounding t helps to get over with the problem of looping
which we stated earlier. We ﬂatten one whole iteration which is enough to demon-
strate the functional correctness of the given block. That is why we bound the
variable only to check the cases starting from t = 0 to t = 5. Once we ﬁnish with
case analysis we prove following trivial lemma
∀ t. (0 ≤ t ∧ t ≤ 5) =⇒
(t = 0) ∨ (t = 1) ∨ (t = 2) ∨ (t = 3) ∨ (t = 4) ∨ (t = 5)
which simply states that when t is bound between 0 and 5, then the only values for
which the correctness theorem needs to hold are t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. We proved the
goal and thus veriﬁed the functionality of the said RTL block.
Following a similar approach, we have proved the correctness of the P/S block.
The details can be found in [1].
4.3 Discussion
The modeling, speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation done above for the OFDM RTL blocks
demonstrate a way to incorporate formal methods in the veriﬁcation of digital sys-
tems. We have described the implementation of the RTL blocks in HOL using
formal logic. For the QAM block, it was straightforward to embed the if-then-else
HDL code in HOL and the speciﬁcation is obtained from IEEE 802.11 speciﬁca-
tion. Although the demodulator block has a similar implementation and its formal
description was similar to the QAM block, but ﬁnding a speciﬁcation to check the
design could not be done using IEEE standard since this block resides in the re-
ceiver side and the designer has the freedom to choose any way to implement it.
Both the speciﬁcations for QAM and demodulator are based on look-up tables and
the implementations were proved against those. For the S/P and P/S blocks, the
speciﬁcations and implementations were also formalized after much consideration
about the VHDL PROCESS. The veriﬁcation of all blocks were done using existing
theories in HOL on real numbers, natural numbers, boolean logic, lists, words and
others. Many lemmas were proved in order to aid the proof steps. Some lemmas
were very trivial but HOL requires each and every proof step to be sound and
complete and that is why there is no ambiguity in the HOL proof. The built-in
rewriting tactics RW TAC was heavily used with the powerful simpliﬁcation sets aug-
mented with the required lemmas and theorems. In most cases, the proof strategy
starts with a rough proof sketch by hand and then formalized in HOL. But, some
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lemmas and intermediate theorems were simple enough to not resort to this ap-
proach.
The main purpose for using formal veriﬁcation was to ﬁnd bugs in the design.
We did not ﬁnd any bug in the blocks. But, some comments are in order. Namely,
for the QAM block, it is given in the standard that the input for a 64-QAM mod-
ulation must follow the constellation diagram shown in Figure 3. The constellation
gives output between −7 to 7 but the implementation used 16 bit 2’s complement
number to represent these numbers while 3 bits would have done the same job. If
the standard is followed exactly, then this issue might have resulted in a bug in the
design. But, the standard gives some ﬂexibility to the designers in order to have
more precise results from the IFFT block, as explained before in Section 4.1. As, we
were aware about it at the time of veriﬁcation, we constrained the implementation
using the proper number of bits. The same comments are applied to the DQAM
block. For the rest of the blocks we did not ﬁnd any issue like this.
A pertinent question can be raised about the higher-order logic used for the
modeling and veriﬁcation of OFDM that - whether ﬁrst-order logic can also be used
for this purpose. The reason is of course automation of proofs and completeness in
some cases. It is mentioned in Chapter 3 that higher-order logic is expressive and
the variables in this logic can be functions and predicates those in turn can take
functions and predicates as arguments and return them too. Whereas ﬁrst-order
logic can only quantify over objects and variables. For the design veriﬁed none of
the RTL blocks can be speciﬁed or veriﬁed using ﬁrst-order logic fully. For instance,
the QAM block cannot be modeled completely using ﬁrst-order logic, although the
implementation of the block—a pure combinational logic circuit—can be modeled
in ﬁrst-order since simple predicate logic is used. But, the instantiated speciﬁcation
of QAM block needs universal quantiﬁcation on functions which were used to access
the tables of the I and Q values for modulation. For, the S/P block, ﬁrst-order logic
cannot be used due to the use of existential quantiﬁcation on the shift register in the
formal modeling of the implementation. The same can be told for the P/S block.
The implementation of the DQAM block can be modeled using ﬁrst-order logic but
the instantiation of the demapping function for modeling the decision region for
speciﬁcation needs to be universally quantiﬁed.
There are other blocks in the OFDM that we did not verify; namely, guard in-
terval insertion and guard interval removal. The reason is that the RTL codes for
those blocks were not available for the design at hand. The guard insertion block in
the transmitter side has a portion of its behavioral code but the whole code mostly
contains port-mapping [3] to the IP blocks. In general, the whole design contains
many IP blocks and thus the veriﬁcation of the design in its entirety is not practical
using any theorem-proving tool like HOL. Still, this chapter demonstrates the scope
and feasibility of formal methods in a comprehensive way in parts of the OFDM
RTL blocks.
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5 Formal Error Analysis
This section describes the error analysis of OFDM modem in a formal way. We ﬁrst
derive expressions for the accumulation of round-oﬀ error in the OFDM structure
and then describe how we proved the corresponding theorems in HOL. Mainly we
focus on the two computational blocks of the design—FFT and IFFT. Among
all the blocks only FFT and IFFT are computational blocks doing arithmetic
operation. Other blocks carry out merely mapping operations of bits from one
domain to another. We take IFFT-FFT combination as the model for the error
analysis of the OFDM modem. Figure 5 shows the block diagram of the IFFT-FFT
combination.
CONJUGA
TION FFT 1/N FFT
CONJUGA
TION
x(n2,n1,n0) B(q2,q1,q0)
A(p2,p1,p0)x* A3 A*3
Fig. 5. Construction of IFFT-FFT
We ﬁrst derive the equations for this system as [1]:
B(q2, q1, q0) =
1
64
∑
p
∑
n
x(n2, n1, n0)(W64)
(L−M)
(3)
where
∑
p
=
3∑
p0=0
3∑
p1=0
3∑
p2=0∑
n
=
3∑
n0=0
3∑
n1=0
3∑
n2=0
L = 16q0n2 + (4q1 + q0)4p1 + (16q2 + 4q1 + q0)p0
M = 16p0n2 + (4p1 + p0)4n1 + (16p2 + 4p1 + p0)n0
(4)
Next we represent this mathematical model in real, ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point
domains. The signal x(n) and twiddle factor W64 are complex numbers and can be
written in terms of their real and imaginary components. In Equation (3) these two
functions are multiplied with each other. We denote the real and imaginary parts of
x(n), B(q), and W64 like C0, D0, C, D, U64, and V64 and rewrite the Equation (3)
as following
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C(q2, q1, q0) =
1
64
∑
p
∑
n
C0(n2, n1, n0)(U64)
(L−M) −D0(n2, n1, n0)(V64)(L−M)
(5)
D(q2, q1, q0) =
1
64
∑
p
∑
n
C0(n2, n1, n0)(V64)
(L−M) + D0(n2, n1, n0)(U64)(L−M)
(6)
Mimicking the analysis of real numbers we ought to deﬁne the equations for
ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point number and state fl(.) and fxp(.) as ﬂoating-point
and ﬁxed-point, respectively. The characters prime and double primes are used to
point to ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point numbers and we will stick to this convention
in the analysis set forth. Using these notations we denote the ﬂoating-point and
ﬁxed-point conversions of C and D as C ′, C ′′, D′, D′′, respectively.
In analyzing the eﬀects of ﬂoating-point roundoﬀ, the eﬀect of rounding is pre-
sented multiplicatively. Let ∗ denote any of the operations +, −, ×, ÷. It is known
[32, 7] that if p represents the precision of the FP format, then
fl(x ∗ y) = (x ∗ y)(1 + δ), where |δ| ≤ 2−p. (7)
While the rounding error for ﬂoating-point arithmetic enters into the system
multiplicatively, it is an additive component for ﬁxed-point arithmetic. In this case,
the fundamental error analysis theorem can be stated as
fxp(x ∗ y) = (x ∗ y) + , where || ≤ 2−fracbits (X) (8)
and fracbits is the number of bits that are to the right of the binary point in the
given FXP format X.
The real part of ﬂoating-point, C ′ , can be written with all the errors due to
ﬂoating-point round-oﬀ as follows, where δ accounts for the round-oﬀ error due to
multiplication of C
′
0 and (U64)
(L−M) according to Equation (7).
C
′
(q2, q1, q0) =
1
64
[∑
p
∑
n
((
C
′
0(n2, n1, n0)(U64)
(L−M)
(1 + δ1024p2+256p1+64p0+16n2+4n1+n0)
)
−(
D
′
0(n2, n1, n0)(V64)
(L−M)
(1 + 1024p2+256p1+64p0+16n2+4n1+n0)
))
(1 + ξ1024p2+256p1+64p0+16n2+4n1+n0)
4095∏
i=1024p2+256p1
+64p0+16n2
+4n1+n0
(1 + λi)
]
(1 + τ)(1 + ρ)
(9)
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The function  represents the error due to the round-oﬀ error after the multipli-
cation of D
′
0 and (V64)
(L−M). The error due to the subtraction of [C
′
0(U64)
(L−M) −
D
′
0(V64)
(L−M)] is represented using ξ. Based on the errors due to one single iteration,
the error due to the two summations
∑
p
∑
n (which is actually an abbreviation for
six summations
∑3
p0=0
∑3
p1=0
∑3
p2=0
∑3
n0=0
∑3
n1=0
∑3
n2=0
can be stated as prod-
ucts of λ where the upper index is set as 4095 due to six iterations each ranging
from 0 to 3 giving 4 × 4 × 4 × 4 × 4 × 4 − 1 = 4095. It should have eclipsed all
the rounding errors in the whole system of equation, but still the fraction 164 incurs
two round-oﬀ errors. One of them due to the division of 1 by 64, denoted as τ and
the other is for the multiplication thereafter with the rest of the equations, denoted
as ρ. These errors can be generalized on the same line of reasoning for the other
equations.
The error related with the imaginary part D
′
of the ﬂoating-point can be written
as
D
′
(q2, q1, q0) =
1
64
[∑
p
∑
n
((
C
′
0(n2, n1, n0)(V64)
(L−M)
(1 + δ
′′
1024p2+256p1+64p0+16n2+4n1+n0)
)
−(
D
′
0(n2, n1, n0)(U64)
(L−M)
(1 + 
′′
1024p2+256p1+64p0+16n2+4n1+n0)
))
(1 + ξ
′′
1024p2+256p1+64p0+16n2+4n1+n0)
4095∏
i=1024p2+256p1
+64p0+16n2
+4n1+n0
(1 + λ
′′
i )
]
(1 + τ
′
)(1 + ρ
′
)
(10)
where the previous function symbols used in Equation (9) are modiﬁed with dou-
ble/single prime, namely δ
′′
, 
′′
, ξ
′′
, λ
′′
, τ
′
, ρ
′
; but the meaning remains the
same. A point to emphasize is that all error functions are in multiplication relation
with the variable and this is what makes the ﬂoating-point round-oﬀ error much
complicated. Similar formulas can be derived for the real and imaginary parts of
ﬁxed-point number, C
′′
and D
′′
.
Adding the error parameters leaves us just one step away before we start to
formalize the analysis after deriving the error that occurred in the conversion from
one domain to another. We start with the real to ﬂoating-point conversion and the
round-oﬀ error diﬀerence between the complex ﬂoating-point implementation and
complex real implementation of IFFT-FFT denoted as e(q2, q1, q0). We derive the
following equation that expresses the round-oﬀ error accumulated due to real to
ﬂoating-point conversion,
e(q2, q1, q0) =
1
64
[∑
p
∑
n
e0(n2, n1, n0)(W64)
(L−M) + f(n,p)
]
(11)
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where we assume
e0(q2, q1, q0) = C
′
0(n2, n1, n0)− C0(n2, n1, n0) + j
(
D
′
0(n2, n1, n0)−D0(n2, n1, n0)
)
(12)
and f(n,p) is written according to Equations (9) and (10)
f(n,p) = C
′
0(n2, n1, n0)(U64)
(L−M)[(1 + δ(p,n))(1 + ξ(p,n)) 4095∏
i=(p,n)
(1 + λi)(1 + τ)− 1
]
−D
′
0(n2, n1, n0)(V64)
(L−M)[(1 + (p,n))(1 + ξ(p,n)) 4095∏
i=(p,n)
(1 + λi)(1 + τ)− 1
]
+ j
[
C
′
0(n2, n1, n0)(V64)
(L−M)[(1 + δ′′(p,n))(1 + ξ′′(p,n))
4095∏
i=(p,n)
(1 + λ
′′
i )(1 + τ
′
)− 1
]
−D
′
0(n2, n1, n0)(U64)
(L−M)[(1 + ′′(p,n))(1 + ξ′′(p,n))
4095∏
i=(p,n)
(1 + λ
′′
i )(1 + τ
′
)− 1
]]
(13)
The two variables n and p are used for the function as a short-hand for n =
n2, n1, n0 and p = p2, p1, p0.
The above analysis can be adopted similarly to come at the following error
function, e
′
(q2, q1, q0), for the round-oﬀ error due to conversion from real to ﬁxed-
point domain
e
′
(q2, q1, q0) = C
′′
(q2, q1, q0)− C(q2, q1, q0) + j
[
D
′′
(q2, q1, q0)−D(q2, q1, q0)
]
(14)
Denoting the error as f ′(n,p), the ﬁnal error can be written as
e
′
(q2, q1, q0) =
1
64
[∑
p
∑
n
e0(n2, n1, n0)(W64)
(L−M) + f ′(n,p)
]
(15)
where f ′(n,p) is constructed as follows
f ′(n,p) =δ
′
(p,n) + 
′
(p,n) + ξ
′
(p,n) +
4095∑
i=(p,n)
λ
′
i + τ
′
+ j
⎡
⎣δ′′′(p,n) + ′′′(p,n) + ξ′′′(p,n) +
4095∑
i=(p,n)
λ
′′′
i + τ
′′′
⎤
⎦
(16)
Equation 16 is much simpliﬁed than its real to ﬂoating-point counterpart since
this error is additive but not multiplicative. To derive the errors due to ﬂoating-
point to ﬁxed-point conversion, we do not resort to derive those mammoth equations
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as above, rather we use the previous derivations. If the two error results derived
previously are subtracted then the result gives the error we are looking for. Denoting
this error as e
′′
(q2, q1, q0), it can be written as
e
′′
(q2, q1, q0) = e
′
(q2, q1, q0)− e(q2, q1, q0) (17)
Figure 6 summarizes all the error analysis discussed so far in a ﬂow-graph format.
They refer to the errors incurred in the real parts of the ﬂoating-point and
ﬁxed-point model.
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Fig. 6. Error Flow Graphs
Starting with C
′
0(n2, n1, n0) from the left branch of Figure 6a, it is multiplied
with U64(L − M) as shown between the edge of the ﬁrst two nodes. Next, the
error occurring in the previous operation is multiplied in the edge between sec-
ond and third node. In the same way we can reach in the similar calculation
for D
′
0(n2, n1, n0). When the two branches meet in the bottom node, they are
subtracted from each other due to multiplication of the D
′
0 with −1 and this
operation adds to the next error which is expressed as 1 + ξN,P . Here, (N,P )
refers to 1024p2 + 256p1 + 64p0 + 16n2 + 4n1 + n0. Now, this error is labeled as
E
′
(p2, p1, p0, n2, n1, n0).
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If the same calculation is repeated for C
′′
0 (n2, n1, n0) and D
′′
0 (n2, n1, n0), the
error at the end is labeled as E
′′
(p2, p1, p0, n2, n1, n0). But, this time the error
functions are all additive not multiplicative. We now look into Figure 6c which
is the continuation of Figure 6a to deﬁne the errors related with the six summa-
tions each having four iterations. As stated before, the error here is denoted as
1 + λi for ﬂoating-point and λi for ﬁxed-point. The error calculation starts from
E
′
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and E
′′
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and the corresponding errors are multiplied
or added till E
′
(3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3) and E
′′
(3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3). At this point, we are left with
two more errors. The branch starting with node label 1N adds errors due to divi-
sion operation, which are denoted as ρ
′
and 1+ ρ for ﬁxed-point and ﬂoating-point
respectively. And then the same constant is multiplied with the rest of the what is
calculated so far and adds another error denoted as τ
′
and 1+ τ for ﬁxed-point and
ﬂoating-point respectively. In the end C
′
and C
′′
are found as we calculated earlier.
The above discussion can be applied as is for the calculation of the imaginary
part of ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point model using the ﬂow-graphs in Figure 6b and
Figure 6d.
5.1 Formal Error Analysis in HOL
For implementing the above error analysis in HOL, we ﬁrst construct complex
numbers on reals similar to [12]. We deﬁne in HOL a new type for complex
numbers, to be in bijection with R × R. The bijections are written in HOL as
complex : R2 → C and coords : C → R2. We use convenient abbreviations for
the real (Re) and imaginary (Im) parts of a complex number, and also deﬁne
arithmetic operations such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication on com-
plex numbers. We overload the usual symbols (+,−,×) for C and R. Similarly,
we construct complex numbers on ﬂoating- and ﬁxed-point numbers. Then we de-
ﬁne the principal N -roots on unity (e−j2π/N = cos (2πn/N) − j sin (2πn/N)),
and its powers (OMEGA) as a complex number using the sine and cosine functions
available in the transcendental theory of the HOL reals library [10]. We specify
expressions in HOL for expansion of a natural number into a binary form in normal
and rearranged order. The above enables us to specify the IFFT-FFT combination
algorithm in real (REAL IFFT FFT ), ﬂoating- (FLOAT IFFT FFT ), and ﬁxed-
point (FXP IFFT FFT ) abstraction levels using recursive deﬁnitions in HOL as
described in Equations (3) and (4). Then we deﬁne the real and imaginary parts of
the IFFT-FFT algorithm (IFFT FFT RE, IFFT FFT IM ) and powers of the prin-
cipal N -roots on unity (OMEGA RE,OMEGA IM ). Later, we prove in separate
lemmas that the real and imaginary parts of the FFT algorithm in real, ﬂoating-
point, and ﬁxed-point levels can be expanded as in Equations (5) and (6). Then
we prove lemmas to introduce an error in each of the arithmetic steps in real and
imaginary parts of the ﬂoating- and ﬁxed-point IFFT-FFT algorithms according to
the Equations (9) and (10). We prove these lemmas using the fundamental error
analysis lemmas for basic arithmetic operations [2]. Then we deﬁne in HOL the er-
ror of the pth element of the ﬂoating- (REAL TO FLOAT IFFT FFT ERROR)
and ﬁxed-point (REAL TO FXP IFFT FFT ERROR) IFFT-FFT algorithms at
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step q, and the corresponding error in transition from ﬂoating- to ﬁxed-point
(FLOAT TO FXP IFFT FFT ERROR). Thereafter, we prove lemmas to rewrite
the errors as complex numbers using the real and imaginary parts. Finally, we
prove the following lemmas to determine the accumulation of roundoﬀ error in
ﬂoating- and ﬁxed-point IFFT-FFT combination algorithm by recursive equations
and initial conditions according to the Equations (11) to (17).
∀ x q0 q1 q2. ∃ f. (IFFT_FFT_REAL_TO_FP_ERROR x q0 q1 q2 =
complex_64 * complex_sum (0,4) (λp0. complex_sum (0,4) (λp1.
complex_sum (0,4) (λp2. complex_sum (0,4) (λn0. complex_sum (0,4)
(λn1. complex_sum (0,4) (λn2.
ERROR_0 x n2 n1 n0 * OMEGA n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
f n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2))))))) ∧
∃ t l d e z t′ l′′ d′′ e′′ z′′. f n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 =
complex ( Val (float_Re ((λn0 n1 n2. float_complex_round (x n0 n1 n2)) n0 n1 n2)) *
Val (FLOAT_OMEGA_RE n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
((1 + d n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
(1 + z n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
mul (ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2,4097 − ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2)
(λi. 1 + l i) * (1 + t) − 1) −
Val (float_Im ((λn0 n1 n2. float_complex_round (x n0 n1 n2)) n0 n1 n2)) *
Val (FLOAT_OMEGA_IM n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
((1 + e n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
(1 + z n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
mul (ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2,4097 − ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2)
(λi. 1 + l i) * (1 + t) − 1),
Val (float_Re ((λn0 n1 n2. float_complex_round (x n0 n1 n2)) n0 n1 n2)) *
Val (FLOAT_OMEGA_IM n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
((1 + d′′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
(1 + z′′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
mul (ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2,4097 − ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2)
(λi. 1 + l′′ i) * (1 + t′) − 1) −
Val (float_Im ((λq0 q1 q2. float_complex_round (x q0 q1 q2)) q0 q1 q2)) *
Val (FLOAT_OMEGA_IM n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
((1 + e n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
(1 + z n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2) *
mul (ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2,4097 − ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2)
(λi. 1 + l i) * (1 + t′) − 1))
∀ X M V x q0 q1 q2. ∃ f′. (IFFT_FFT_REAL_TO_FXP_ERROR X M V x q0 q1 q2 =
complex_64 *
complex_sum (0,4) (λp0. complex_sum (0,4) (λp1.
complex_sum (0,4) (λp2. complex_sum (0,4) (λn0.
complex_sum (0,4) (λn1. complex_sum (0,4) (λn2.
ERROR′_0 X M V x n2 n1 n0 * OMEGA n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
f′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2))))))) ∧
∃t′ l′ d′ e′ z′ t′′′ l′ d′′′ e′′′ z′′′.
f′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 =
complex (d′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
e′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
z′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
sum (ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2,4096 −
ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2)(λi. l′ i) + t′,
d′′′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
e′′′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
z′′′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
e′ n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2 q0 q1 q2 +
sum (ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2,4096 −
ER_K n0 n1 n2 p0 p1 p2) (λi. l′′′ i) + t′′′)
∀ X M V x q0 q1 q2. IFFT_FFT_FP_TO_FXP_ERROR X M V x q0 q1 q2
= right−hand side of [ REAL to FP error theorem ] −
right−hand side of [ REAL to FXP error theorem ]
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5.2 Discussion
The error analysis done above covers the OFDM rounding error analysis thoroughly
between diﬀerent number domains. To establish the complete theory of error anal-
ysis we proved three main theorems with the help of formalized real and imaginary
part of FFT-IFFT expansion and also the theorems related to the error for arith-
metic operations. All deﬁnitions were derived heavily from existing theories, e.g.,
realTheory, boolTheory, ieeeTheory, ﬂoatTheory, fxpTheory, wordTheory, etc. There
is a very strong relationship between mathematical models and their formal coun-
terpart which might have been observed above. The deﬁnitions built on top of
established theories in turn helped to build the FFT and IFFT components; which
build the theory for the FFT-IFFT combinations. Then this theory is extended and
the operators are overloaded for establishing the real, ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point
counterparts of the design using the ﬂoatTheory and fxpTheory.
For all the theorems and assumptions in the whole error analysis work it is im-
perative that higher-order logic be used. The error analysis is based on the ﬂoating-
point and ﬁxed-point theory of HOL, which are two of the most important additions
in HOL’s rich theory base. Besides quantiﬁcation over variables and objects, there
are many theorems in both theories that make use of quantiﬁcation over functions.
Moreover, almost all the deﬁnitions required to model the FFT-IFFT combination
needed higher-order logic for the same reason. The error analysis functions of both
ﬂoating-point and ﬁxed-point (δ, , ξ, λ ,τ , and ρ) are all existentially quantiﬁed in
the main theorems proved and these theorems construct the core of the ﬁnal result.
Throughout the proof of the theories built-in tactics and tacticals were used. In
many of these proofs case analysis and induction were used. Our main approach to
prove the theorems was to have a rough paper and pencil sketch of the approach
and then formalize it using the techniques available in the HOL tool. Many times
it happened that it was hard to prove the theorem as a whole in one shot and then
we break the goal in manageable size to prove the parts separately to combine later.
To accomplish this in a diﬀerent way sometimes theorems are assumed in the proof
to concentrate in the core goal and later the assumed theorem is proved. Thus we
prove the theorems till the ﬁnal error analysis between ﬂoating-point to ﬁxed-point.
Through the course of the modeling and proof, many lemmas are developed, some
are trivial but essential and some are crucial to move to the next step in establishing
a theorem. But, it is important to mention that the current theorems can be proved
in a better way which is realized gradually as we moved to much complicated proofs
and so the latter proofs are better and concise than the previous ones.
Another important issue needs to be addressed and also equally applicable for all
the theorems proved in Chapter 4 is that how it can be assured that the deﬁnitions
created by the user themselves are sound and really characterize what the system
user intends to formalize. In short, there is no way to verify that the modeling in
HOL done by the user reﬂects the hardware exactly. The tool can check all the type
requirements based on the initial information of the system provided by the user,
and if these information are wrong then the ﬁnal formalization will also be wrong.
The HOL system is based on ﬁve axioms and eight primitive inference rules. All
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the HOL theories are built on top of them and this is another reason of the lengthy
installation time required since all the built-in theories are to be proved before be-
coming part of the initial system. This is why there is no chance to have ambiguity
in the proof system of HOL. Although highly improbable, but a wrong implementa-
tion can be veriﬁed against a wrong speciﬁcation. Each and every possible scenario
can happen. The tool itself might not be free from bugs. That is, however, why a
tool like HOL needs expert users who have good knowledge of formal methods and
also of the system under veriﬁcation. The same can be told about the real RTL
design in simulation where only the functionality of the system can be veriﬁed but
it can never be assured completely that the ﬁnal product will exactly behave as the
speciﬁcation due to manufacturing diﬃciencies or other factors.
Since HOL is an interactive tool where the user needs to guide every step of
the proof, it is also possible that the theorem prover can be guided to falsely proof
a system. But, HOL strongly checks the type of the terms and functions entered
into the system. This particular constraint also makes it very diﬃcult to make
simple mistakes in deﬁning wrong theorems thus also answers partially the concern
mentioned in the previous paragraph. Still, if any user wants to trick the tool to
generate proof arbitrarily, he/she has to use oracle [15] mechanism that enables
arbitrary formulas to become elements of the thm type. By use of this mechanism,
HOL can utilize the results of arbitrary proof procedures. To avoid unsoundness,
a tag is attached to any theorem coming from an oracle. This tag is propagated
through every inference that the theorem participates in and if falsity becomes de-
rived, the oﬀending oracle can be found by examining the tags component of the
theorem. A theorem proved without use of any oracle will have an empty tag, and
can thus be considered to have been proved solely by deductive steps in the HOL
logic. Thus, the tool ensures its security against misuse.
6 Conclusion
This paper is mainly concerned to demonstrate the use of formal veriﬁcation tech-
niques, here theorem proving, to verify an implementation of an OFDM modem
based on the IEEE 802.11a physical layer standard for wireless communication.
The OFDM design is fairly complex and some important design blocks were cho-
sen for veriﬁcation purposes. We formally modeled and veriﬁed the RTL blocks
such as QAM, DQAM, S/P, and P/S against the corresponding speciﬁcations in
the standard. We were able to ﬁnd a bug in the QAM modulation block which
implementation was diverted from the constellation provided in the IEEE standard
speciﬁcation.
We also analyzed the errors in the OFDM system occurring at the time of con-
verting from one number domain to the other, for all three domains—ideal real,
ﬂoating-point, and ﬁxed-point numbers. We used the IFFT-FFT combination as
a model for the error analysis of the whole system. Then we derived new expres-
sions for the accumulation of round-oﬀ error in the OFDM system and proved the
corresponding theorems in HOL. This formalization can be considered as a large
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application of the formal error analysis framework described before and shows the
viability of such analysis even for larger scale systems as the one analyzed.
The future work that can be carried out pertaining to this paper might elucidate
new and interesting ideas and some suggestions are following:
• Verifying the RTL implementation of the OFDM blocks by taking into account
clock transitions and other timing constraints.
• Development of a parameterized error analysis pattern for any FFT or IFFT
design of arbitrary computing point and radix.
• Performing statistical error analysis for the OFDM modem to ﬁnd average and
mean square errors for IFFT-FFT combination. To perform such an analysis
mechanically, we need to use a formal theory on the properties of random variables
and random processes [13, 18].
• Verifying the OFDM system using a combination of HOL and another powerful
computer algebra system such as Maple [26] or Mathematica [27].
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